Alvin E. Roth
1951
Books
- Who Gets What—And Why
- Moral Economics
- The market for federal judicial law clerks
- Laboratory Experimentation in Economics
- Handbook of Experimental Economics, Volume 2
- Who gets what--and why
- Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining
- What have we learned from market design?
- Laboratory experimentation in economics
- Two-Sided Matching
- The handbook of experimental economics
- Pairwise kidney exchange
- Two-sided matching
- Repugnance as a constraint on markets
- Information and aspirations in two person bargaining
- Online and Matching-Based Market Design
- Marketplace institutions related to the timing of transactions
- Deferred acceptance algorithms
- Last minute bidding and the rules for ending second-price auctions
- Laboratory Experimentation in Economics
- Shapley Value
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
- Kim Neyi Neden Alir?
- Efficient kidney exchange
- Kidney exchange
- Repugnance as a constraint on markets
- Axiomatic models of bargaining
- The Nash solution and the utility of bargaining
- Shapley Value
- Handbook of Experimental Economics
- Who Gets What
- QUIÉN OBTIENE QUÉ Y POR QUÉ
- The handbook of experimental economics
- Como Funcionam os Mercados
- Game-theoretic models of bargaining
- The Shapley value
- Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining
- The redesign of the matching market for American physicians
- Values for games without sidepayments
- The Shapley Value
Author data: Open Library