Lucian Arye Bebchuk
Books
- Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law Evolution
- The Effects of Insider Trading on Insiders' Choice Among Risky Investment Projects
- Takeover Bids below the Expected Value of Minority Shares
- Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control
- Chapter 11
- A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control
- Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation
- Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem
- Stealth compensation via retirement benefits
- The Effect of Insider Trading on Insiders' Reaction to Opportunities to "Waste" Corporate Value
- Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer
- An Analysis of Fee-Shifting Based on the Margin of Victory
- The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy
- Ex Ante Costs of Violating Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy
- The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers
- Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements
- Do Short-Term Managerial Objectives Lead to Under- or Over-Investment in Long-Term Projects
- Optimal Sanctions When Individuals are Imperfectly Informed About the Probability of Apprehension
- Corporate Ownership Structures
- The Effect of Offer-of-Settlement Rules on the Terms of Settlement
- Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the Incentive to Reveal Information
- Using Options to Divide Value in Corporate Bankruptcy
- Corporate Law and Economic Analysis
- Bargaining and the Division of Value in Corporate Reorganization
- Optimal Sanctions When the Probability of Apprehension Varies Among Individuals
- Negative Expected Value Suits
- Managerial Value Diversion and Shareholder Wealth
- The Overlooked Corporate Finance Problems of a Microsoft Breakup
- The Business roundtable's untenable case against shareholder access
- Information and the scope of liability for breach of contract
Author data: Open Library