Drew Fudenberg

Pricing under the threat of entry by a sole supplier of a network good

Game Theory

Learning to play Bayesian games

Predation without reputation

Reputation, unobserved strategies, and active supermartingales

Self-confirming equilibrium

The Folk Theorem with imperfect public information

Noncooperative game theory for industrial organization

The neo-Luddite's lament

A long-run collaboration on long-run games

Dynamic models of oligopoly

Finite player approximations to a continuum of players

Reputation in the simultaneous play of multiple opponents

Perfect Bayesian and sequential equilibria

Learning mixed equilibria

Explaining cooperation and commitment in repeated games

Dynamic Models of Oligopoly

Bo yi lun

The theory of learning in games

On the robustness of equilibrium refinements

Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games

An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information

Equilibrium payoffs with long-run and short-run players and imperfect public information

Maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed

game theory

The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting and with incomplete information

On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games

Reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player

Moral hazard and renegotiation in agency contracts

Repeated games with long-run and short-run players

Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players

Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium

On the robustness of equilibrium refinements

Sequential bargaining with many buyers

Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships

Monopoly and credibility in asset markets

Steady state learning and Nash equilibrium