Oliver D. Hart
Books
- Improving bankruptcy protection
- Foundations of incomplete contracts
- Takeover bids vs. proxy fights in contests for corporate control
- An economist's perspective on the theory of the firm
- Debt and seniority
- Different approaches to bankruptcy
- Firms, contracts, and financial structure
- Incomplete contracts and the theory of the firm
- Contract renegotiation and coasian dynamics
- Vertical integration and market foreclosure
- A theory of corporate financial structure based on the seniority of claims
- A theory of firm scope
- Capital structure decisions of a public company
- Hold-up, asset ownership, and reference points
- On the design of hierarchies
- A theory of corporate financial structure based on the seniority of claims
- Foundations of incomplete contracts
- Bargaining and strikes
- Capital structure as a control mechanism in corporations
- The theory of contracts
- Default and renegotiation
- A theory of debt based on the inalienability of human capital
- Agreeing now to argue later
- Agreeing now to agree later
- Contracts as reference points
- Norms and the theory of the firm
- The proper scope of government
- A theory of debt based on the inalienability of human capital
- Incomplete contracts and renegotiation
- 现代合约理论
- Property rights and the nature of the firm
- Reference points and the theory of the firm
- Cooperatives vs. outside ownership
- Default and renegotiation
- Financial contracting
Author data: Open Library