A. Mitchell Polinsky
Books
- Repeat offenders and the theory of deterrence
- The economic theory of public enforcement of law
- The fairness of sanctions
- On the disutility and discounting of imprisonment and the theory of deterrence
- Punitive damages
- Legal error, litigation and the incentive to obey the law
- Pŏp kyŏngjehak immun
- Amenities and property values in a model of an urban area
- Decoupling liability
- Enforcement costs and the optimal magnitude and probability of fines
- Notes on the symmetry of taxes and subsidies in pollution control
- Remedies for price overcharges
- The theory of public enforcement of law
- An empirical reconciliation of micro and grouped estimates of the demand for housing
- The demand for housing
- Legal origins and modern stock markets
- On the disutility and discounting of imprisonment and the theory of deterrence
- Should liability be based on the harm to the victim or the gain to the injurer?
- Imperfect clubs, local public goods, and a pure theory of fiscal location
- Should liability be based on the harm to the victim or the gain to the injurer?
- Introduction to Law and Economics
- Contribution and claim reduction among antitrust defendants
- Economic analysis of law
- Mandatory versus voluntary disclosure of product risks
- Optimal awards and penalties when the probabilty of prevailing varies among plaintiffs
- Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe
- The efficiency of paying compensation in the Pigovian solution to externality problems
- Sanctioning frivolous suits
- Handbook of law and economics
- Corruption and optimal law enforcement
- Economics and liability for accidents
- A model of optimal fines for repeat offenders
- Optimal cleanup and liability after environmentally harmful discharges
- On the choice between property rules and liability rules
- Optimal cleanup and liability after environmentally harmful discharges
- An introduction to law and economics
- A damage-revelation rationale for coupon remedies
- The economic theory of public enforcement of law
- A note on optimal fines when wealth varies among individuals
- Products liability, consumer misperceptions, and market power
Author data: Open Library