Two-Sided Matching Markets
by Xuan Zhang
Two-sided matching markets are a cornerstone of modern economics. They model a wide range of applications such as ride-sharing, online dating, job positioning, school admissions, and many more. In many of those markets, monetary exchange does not play a role. For instance, the New York City public high school system is free of charge. Thus, the decision on how eighth-graders are assigned to public high schools must be made using concepts of fairness rather than price. There has been therefore a huge amount of literature, mostly in the economics community, defining various concepts of fairness in different settings and showing the existence of matchings that satisfy these fairness conditions. Those concepts have enjoyed wide-spread success, inside and outside academia. However, finding such matchings is as important as showing their existence. Moreover, it is crucial to have fast (i.e., polynomial-time) algorithms as the size of the markets grows. In many cases, modern algorithmic tools must be employed to tackle the intractability issues arising from the big data era. The aim of my research is to provide mathematically rigorous and provably fast algorithms to find solutions that ex
For young readers
Book data: Open Library