Information aggregation in financial markets
This dissertation consists of three essays on information aggregation in financial markets. The first essay develops a model to study the interplay between information aggregation in financial markets and a firm's investment decision. We find that dispersed information results in a wedge between the stock price and expected dividend value of the firm. When the investment decision of the firm is endogenous to the share price, the wedge is asymmetric: larger on the upside when there is a lot of investment (shares are over-valued), than on the downside when there is little investment (shares are under-valued). On average, the share price is over-valued. We discuss the role of tying managerial incentives to the firm's share price, finding that such incentives exacerbate asset over-valuation and introduce excess volatility and inefficiency in investment decisions. The second essay argues that the capacity of financial markets to aggregate information is diminished in times of distress, resulting in countercyclical economic uncertainty. I build a rational expectations equilibrium model in which financial intermediaries with private information become increasingly exposed to non-fundament
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