The inevitable instability of American corporate governance
by Mark J. Roe
"American corporate governance faces two core instabilities. The first is the separation of ownership from control?distant and diffuse stockholders own, while concentrated management controls?a separation that creates not only great efficiencies but also big recurring breakdowns. In every decade since World War II, we've faced a fundamental large firm problem. Each emanated from this fundamental instability. We will not stabilize, once-and-for-all, this instability because some form of separation is necessary for large firms, because it provides large efficiencies, and because once we resolve one derivative problem, another will in time arise. The Enron-type scandals are just the latest manifestation of the core fissure in the large American public firm. The second instability arises from our decentralized and porous regulatory system.^ Decentralization has key advantages?such as flexibility, specialization, and multiple informational channels?but with the advantages come costs in porosity. Our decentralized regulatory system leaves each regulator with weaknesses. Most importantly, they are not fully independent from the regulated. The regulated entities often deter the incompletel
For young readers
Book data: Open Library